The long credit crunch that began in the Atlantic world in August 2007 is strange in its extraordinary scope and intensity. Mainstream discourse, referring to a ‘sub-prime’ crisis, implies that the credit crunch has been caused, rather than triggered, by a bubble in the real economy. This is at best naïve: after all, the bursting of an equally large bubble in the Spanish housing market led to no such blow-out in the domestic banking system.footnote¹ The notion that falling house prices could shut down half of all lending in the us economy within a matter of months—and not just mortgages, but car loans, credit-card receivables, commercial paper, commercial property and corporate debt—makes no sense. In quantitative terms this amounted to a credit shrinkage of about $24 trillion dollars, nearly double us gdp.footnote² Erstwhile lenders were soon running not just from sub-prime securities but from the supposedly safest debt of all, the ‘super senior’ category, whose price by the end of 2007 was a tenth of what it had been just a year before.footnote³

An understanding of the credit crunch requires us to transcend the commonsense idea that changes in the so-called real economy drive outcomes in a supposed financial superstructure. Making this ‘epistemological break’ is not easy. One reason why so few economists saw a crisis coming, or failed to grasp its scale even after it had hit, was that their models had assumed both that financial systems ‘work’, in the sense of efficiently aiding the operations of the real economy, and that financial trends themselves are of secondary significance.footnote⁴ Thus the assumption that the massive bubble in oil prices between the autumn of 2007 and the summer of 2008 was caused by supply-and-demand factors, rather than by financial operators who, reeling from the onset of the crisis, blew the price from $70 a barrel to over $140 in less than a year, before letting the bubble burst last June; a cycle with hugely negative ‘real economy’ effects. Similar explanations were tendered for soaring commodity prices over the same period; yet these were largely caused by institutional investors, money-market and pension funds, fleeing from lending to the Wall Street banks, who poured hundreds of billions of dollars into commodities indices, while hedge funds with their backs against the wall pumped up bubbles in coffee and cocoa.footnote⁵

Breaking with the orthodoxy that it was ‘real economy’ actors that caused the crisis carries a political price: it means that blame can no longer be pinned on mortgage borrowers for the credit crunch, on the Chinese for the commodities bubble, or on restrictive Arab producers for the sudden soaring of oil. Yet it may allow us to understand otherwise inexplicable features of the crisis; not least, as we shall see, the extraordinary growth of sub-prime itself. We will thus take as our starting point the need to explore the structural transformation of the American financial system over the past twenty-five years. I will argue that a New Wall Street System has emerged in the us during this period, producing new actors, new practices and new dynamics. The resulting financial structure-cum-agents has been the driving force behind the present crisis. En route, it proved spectacularly successful for the richest groups in the us: the financial sector constituted by far the most profitable component of the American and British economies and their most important ‘export’ earner. In 2006, no less than 40 per cent of American corporate profits accrued to the financial sector.footnote⁶ But the new structure necessarily produced the dynamics that led towards blow-out.

This analysis is not offered as a mono-causal explanation of the crisis. A fundamental condition, creating the soil in which the New Wall Street System could grow and flourish, was the project of the ‘fiat’ dollar system, the privatization of exchange-rate risk and the sweeping away of exchange controls—all euphemized as ‘financial globalization’. Furthermore, the system could not have risen and flourished if it had not offered answers—however ultimately pathological—to a range of deep-seated problems within American capitalism overall. There is thus a rational, dialectical kernel in the superficial distinction between financial superstructure and the ‘real’ us economy. In what follows, I will first sketch the main elements of the New Wall Street System, and briefly show how its crisis took such spectacular forms. I will then argue that, to understand the deeper roots of the malaise, we do indeed need to probe into the overall socio-economic and socio-political characteristics of American capitalism as it has evolved over the past twenty-five years. I will raise the possibility of systemic alternatives, including that of a public-utility credit and banking model. Finally, I will consider the international dynamics unleashed by the present crisis and their implications for what I have elsewhere described as the Dollar–Wall Street Regime.footnote⁷

The structure and dynamics of Wall Street banking changed dramatically in the quarter of a century after the mid-1980s. The main features of the new system include: (i) the rise of the lender-trader model; (ii) speculative arbitrage and asset-price bubble-blowing; (iii) the drive for maximizing leverage and balance-sheet expansion; (iv) the rise of the shadow banking system, with its London arm, and associated ‘financial innovations’; (v) the salience of the money markets and their transformation into funders of speculative trading in asset bubbles; (vi) the new centrality of credit derivatives. These changes mutually re-enforced each other, forming an integrated and complex whole, which then disintegrated in the course of 2008. We will briefly examine each of them in turn.

For most of the post-war period, Wall Street investment banks engaged in very little securities trading on their own account, as opposed to trading on behalf of clients; while the big depository commercial banks shunned such activity. But from the mid-1980s on, proprietary trading in financial and other assets became an increasingly central activity for the investment banks, and for many commercial banks, too. This turn was connected, firstly, to the new volatility in foreign-exchange markets after the dismantling of Bretton Woods; and then to the opportunities created by domestic financial liberalization, above all the scrapping of capital controls and the opening of other national financial systems to American operators. These changes offered opportunities for a massive expansion of Wall Street trading activity, which would become a crucial source of profits for the investment banks.footnote⁸ The turn towards speculative proprietary trading was pioneered by Salomon Brothers, whose Arbitrage Group was established in 1977 and acquired extraordinary profitability under John Meriwether during the 1980s.footnote⁹

As well as trading on their own account, the Wall Street banks became increasingly involved in lending funds for other bodies to use in their trading activities: hedge funds, so-called private equity groups (trading in companies), or special investment vehicles (sivs) and conduits, created by the investment banks themselves.footnote¹⁰ Such lending, known in the jargon as prime brokerage, was also an extremely profitable activity for the Wall Street banks: for many, their single greatest earner.footnote¹¹ This turn to the lender-trader model did not mean that the investment banks ceased their traditional activities in investment banking, broking, fund management, etc. But these activities acquired a new significance in that they provided the banks with vast amounts of real-time market information of great value for their trading activity.footnote¹²