The joint US-Israeli air and sea offensive against Iran, launched twelve days ago in the midst of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, has triggered a regional war, affecting neighbouring countries throughout the Persian Gulf. Arron Reza Merat, a former correspondent in Tehran, spoke with a senior figure within Iran’s state media who describes his experience of the bombing of Tehran; the dynamics of escalation; the state of the Iranian economy; press coverage of the war; and the appointment of the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Sidecar has not been able to confirm all of the specific claims made in the following interview, which is published as an establishment perspective from a nation under attack.
As a resident of Tehran what have you seen since the war began on 28 February?
After the opening salvos more than half the city emptied, as people left for the north or their ancestral towns across the country. But they have started to come back. The Americans and the Israelis have been carrying out attacks on sites across the city. Each day they target a different quarter: one day the east, another day the west, the next downtown. Almost all are precision strikes. I would say there are between ten and twenty a day, which in a city as large as Tehran you don’t necessarily see but you do hear. The sound of the jets is very frightening, more frightening in a way than the bombs themselves. What has been most surprising is that there has been almost no anti-aircraft fire like there was in the Twelve-Day War last June. This leaves us very exposed. So far the American and Israeli strikes have mainly hit the [IRGC] guards’ and Basiji buildings in Tehran, but also police stations, from regional precinct houses to the national headquarters in the north of the capital. There have been a few exceptions to this pattern. An empty school was hit and the emergency ward of the Gandhi Hospital was also destroyed. Over the weekend Israelis started targeting fuel depots and petroleum storage facilities. Another exception was their opening attack against the compound of the Supreme Leader. I was driving a block away when it happened. I saw the particles of the whole block sweep over our cars. It was an enormous bomb. They have struck the site again in recent days with many jets. It woke us in the early hours of the morning. The sound of the jets was terrifying. It’s difficult to explain.
Who is running Iran now?
In the early days of the war, after the Supreme Leader was martyred, a provisional council was officially in charge. But Iranian politics works through backchannels and the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by Ali Larijani, was pulling the strings. But in recent days the Assembly of Experts nominated a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei.
How has his appointment been received?
Many ordinary Iranians, especially the religious, see him as a very good replacement for his father. They feel vindicated by the appointment and see it as a sign of victory. But for sure, there are divisions. The upper classes may not approve of him for several reasons. First, his appointment might mean the continuation of his father’s hardline policies. Some see it as an engineered outcome, in the works not just over the past weeks but for years. For some, it recalls the dynastic tradition present before the revolution – sons taking the place of their fathers. These anxieties exist and will continue to.
There are also reports he has been injured. They haven’t indicated how, whether in the first day’s strike on the compound of the Supreme Leader or in a later attack, but some media are calling him ‘a veteran of the Ramadan War’, as the ongoing war is now being called. Many are waiting to see whether he has recorded a speech that will be aired on state TV in the coming days. I personally think that he probably hasn’t, and is waiting to see what course events take before he addresses the nation. When he does, his words will likely be taken as an indication of what course Iran should follow over the coming months, as was the tradition with the former leader.
What is Mojtaba Khamenei’s background?
He hasn’t had a political career and has always been in the shadows. He has never held any official role, whether in the administration or the armed forces. He has remained in the office of the Supreme Leader, and people always said that he belonged to his father. But since the 2008–09 uprising, which led to the house arrest of opposition leaders, his name began to surface more frequently, and people like [opposition leader] Mehdi Karroubi have said that he rose to a very high level. He was personally involved in important decisions, and it is believed that he was responsible for the tough actions that were taken to silence protesters and opposition leaders. The same sources indicated that Mojtaba Khamenei was working closely with a vast network of hardliners, key figures in the IRGC, the military and other powerful sectors.
My sense is that he could take one of two courses: he could become tougher than his father, more radical, as in the scenario that we have seen in North Korea, for example, and continue to defy America; or he could pursue an opening to the world. There are some signs that the latter scenario is more plausible. Larijani gave a short interview to state TV on Sunday night. After congratulating Mojtaba Khamenei on his appointment he told the audience that the new Supreme Leader’s tenure will be a time of economic prosperity and expansion, suggesting a softer foreign policy line, at least at the start. Other signs point in the same direction. The most important of these is that Iran’s economic situation is very, very fragile due to sanctions. Iran has no other option but to repair its relations with the West and with the US, despite all the resistance it has shown, and may look to the lifting of sanctions to allow the country to export more oil and attract investment.
You have worked for decades within the Iranian state media system. What is your impression of the coverage of the US-Israeli war in the Western press?
While there is often accuracy regarding the facts there is a lot of exaggeration and errors of interpretation. For example, Iran is not yet fighting an ‘all-out war’, there is no ‘apocalyptic’ feeling in Tehran, as I have seen reported in much of the Western press and on the BBC World Service. The war is very dangerous, but it is still in a controlled phase. Both sides, which have a tremendous capacity for violence, are limiting its use. Red lines were, of course, crossed with the killing of the Iranian leadership and Iran’s counterattack against Israel and American bases across the region. In terms of killing specific commanders and political leaders, Israel knows Iran cannot retaliate eye for eye. But with oil infrastructure it can. At present the red lines are the oil installations and the Bushehr nuclear reactor, where there are a number of Russian workers who have not been evacuated. If oil facilities in the south are hit, Iran will hit back against oil infrastructure in the Gulf. This would cause a global energy crisis and have serious repercussions for our neighbours’ economies, many of which rely exclusively on oil and tourism.
There are recent indications that the Israelis might be willing to drag the US in further, but even the strikes on 7 March against petroleum storage sites, including near the Shahr-e Rey refinery, do not cross the current red lines. During the June war, Israel carried out similar attacks on two oil depots in Tehran. This time they severely affected air quality, turning the following day into night, and causing people to try to leave the city again out of concern for their health.
If a refinery or oil fields or a petrochemical plant or major power plants are hit, this would cross a red line, because it would impede the ability of the country to generate wealth. In that case, Iran would adopt a different strategy, aimed at water and energy infrastructure in Israel and the Gulf. Unfortunately, sowing chaos and killing leaders is already in bounds.
Western outlets report as plain fact that Iran’s capacity to launch missiles has been degraded. They base this claim on the drop in tempo of Iranian attacks on Israel and US bases. The drop-off is real, but it is for strategic reasons. Iran is vast, the size of Western Europe, and has decades’ worth of plans to hide and deploy its ballistic arsenal in just such an event as this. In the early days of the war, Iran successfully conducted strikes on US bases and radar stations, while carrying out limited strikes on oil and gas infrastructure, mainly using drones. The government is trying to control the rate of escalation so that it can maintain a reasonably low tempo of strikes, using cheaper, older missiles and drones while the other side uses up its expensive interceptors. Iran is also carefully watching the international financial markets and will calibrate its use of violence accordingly, in an effort to maintain control of the war.
Reporting, even in reputable publications, has widely stated that the Strait of Hormuz is closed. This is not true. Perhaps some ships have decided not to cross, but that does not mean it is closed. These are simply business decisions. If Iran wanted to close the Strait it would be a last resort, because the Chinese economy depends on it and China supports us to a certain extent. Iran would close down the Strait with mines or by sinking a large ship – it is very shallow and this would stop maritime traffic.
Lastly, much of the Western press has reported propaganda about the Kurds invading Iran as if it was military reality. The US killed scores of Iranian border guards and attempted to use the media to prompt the Kurds into action. But that was never going to happen. Iran maintains strong relations with Kurdish leaders inside the country as well as in Iraq. It has also established strong deterrence against the separatists for decades now. I think Trump was unaware of this.
Can you comment on recent reports of the US planning for a ground invasion?
There are reports of two possible scenarios. One is Kharg Island. It is uninhabited and home to Iran’s oil export terminals. It has served this purpose for many decades, dating back to before the revolution, and nearly all of Iran’s oil goes through it via pipelines from the mainland and then on via shipping containers to international customers. It is very important strategically – you might say the lifeblood of the Iranian economy. It is well guarded and, for sure, the Iranian military has special plans to protect it in emergency situations. Invasion was tried during the Iran–Iraq War, so the government has experience in such events. If the Americans try to land troops on the island, Iran’s response will be massive. I don’t think such an invasion will ever materialize but maybe Trump and his government have a unique plan.
Another scenario is a Venezuela-style attack to seize Iranian enriched uranium. This, I think, may be possible. From my point of view, Trump is desperately looking for a pretext to end the war. He could potentially deploy special forces near Iran’s nuclear sites in Isfahan, snap photos and record videos, and withdraw them just as quickly, and then claim that they have seized the uranium. Even if they fail to do so they can release pictures, set off a few explosions, return and enjoy this declaration of victory.
How does the Iranian media function by comparison with its Western counterparts?
The discourse on foreign affairs in both Iran and in Western countries is controlled by the state, either formally or through self-censorship. This control is weakening everywhere through social media; in Iran it is also eroded by opposition media, whose editorial line is shaped by Iran’s enemies.
State media is a little like the BBC in Britain. There are topics which cannot be discussed. In Iran, the government can be criticized but not the Supreme Leader or by extension the foreign policy which he controls. In Britain, Zionism cannot be criticized, and as soon as it is journalists and commentators are immediately taken off the air. Gary Lineker was a clear example of this. He was fired for making some very mild comments about Israel’s military actions in Gaza. Iranian journalists are aware that Iran remains a traditional and religious society, so criticism or mockery of religion is out of bounds. Every society has its own red lines.
Opposition outlets, particularly Iran International, which is funded by Iran’s enemies, have undeniably diminished our government’s control of public opinion. For example, opposition outlets knew about many assassinations of our leaders before the domestic press, which implies they are getting their information from the IDF. These channels attribute our poor economic circumstances exclusively to government mismanagement and corruption, which is at best only half true. They never link economic hardship to the sanctions imposed by the West, which ban international companies from trading with Iran and deny the government access to its own revenues abroad, principally from oil. These channels were very influential during the January protests against the government.
How so?
First let me talk about the protests, then I’ll return to the opposition media. The root cause of unrest, I think, was the pressure caused by rising inflation, principally the result of sanctions and declining global oil prices. Sanctions have caused real damage to Iran’s economy since they were reimposed in 2018, after Trump left the JCPOA, but their impact became much more visible in the second half of last year as the front companies that are used to onshore oil revenues were themselves hit by sanctions or their managers made off with the money. Iran once earned $140 billion a year from oil, but that has now sunk to $20-30 billion. The corruption scandal last year meant that a third of this revenue, which was earmarked to import basic staples, especially food and animal fodder, disappeared. The food arrived in the ports but was not unloaded. This caused the price of food to soar. The cost of premium rice increased fivefold in one year. The government makes a big deal about agents provocateurs among the protesters, but I think the opposition media was more of a factor as they capitalized on economic grievances. Security was tough. The system overreacted but knew it might escalate and get out of control. That caused a lot of deaths; however, the figures were exaggerated by US-based NGOs. The government has said that just over 3,000 were killed; six or seven hundred were rioters and the others were innocent people caught in the crossfire. Foreign media were saying 30,000 or even 70,000. Even some people in Iran I spoke with began to use these figures.
How do you think this war will affect Iran’s relations with other states in the region?
Iran can never accept an equal footing with the GCC nations. They are rich but they are only a threat to the extent that they are outposts of the US military, which encircles us. They are very small countries, with tiny populations if you exclude foreigners. Iran, I must admit, has always felt superior. Many of these states are more economically successful than us, but politically Iran can never treat them as equal partners. Rouhani, who was more reformist than most of our presidents, once told a Kuwaiti politician that Iran can eat little Gulf countries for dessert: ‘You countries of the GCC group are like this faloodeh to us. You are easy to eat and do not cause indigestion’.
How do you see the war itself unfolding?
Some of my friends, even those who work for the government in important positions, think this will lead to the collapse of the system. I don’t. The popular force capable of bringing this about is absolutely absent. Like everyone else, they are afraid of this war. I think the government, despite losing many experienced people, still has control. I am part of the system but this is my honest assessment, based on what I read and what I hear inside Iran. The Iranian side is waiting for the Trump side to move and the Trump side is waiting for the Iranian people to move. If Trump loses patience and stops the attacks, Iran will swiftly stop its attacks too and come to a ceasefire. Trump will claim victory and say he has obliterated Iran’s missile programme and its air defences and that the imminent threat from Iran has been contained. That seems to be the most probable scenario, though in a conflict of this scale events can turn abruptly, often through accident or miscalculation.
Read on: Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Iran Under Fire’, NLR 157.