Starting with Maduro’s abduction and the garrotting of Cuba via its Venezuelan oil supply, then swiftly tipping over into a harebrained assault on Iran that led to the throttling of the global economy via the Strait of Hormuz, 2026 could reasonably be termed the year of the ‘chokepoint’; further constriction may be in store with attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, Ansarullah’s gains on the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Ukrainian targeting of Russian refining capacity. Published in 2025, Edward Fishman’s Chokepoints had already made bestseller lists and received glowing coverage from the Economist, Wall Street Journal, Guardian and Foreign Policy before this cascade of events appeared to confirm its topicality. Fishman was quick to capitalize, claiming in the New York Times that Iran had learned from the us ‘playbook’ to exploit the Strait, though this was a stretch: Hormuz had long been recognized on both sides as Iran’s latent deterrent, and the American tactics in question are premised not on geography but dollar and technological supremacy.

Fishman is a typical Beltway figure, with one foot in government and another in the opinion-forming organs of us foreign policy. At Yale, he took a ba in history and held a fellowship in the Grand Strategy programme, before briefly working at the Treasury Department in 2011 as assistant to one of his book’s protagonists, David Cohen—then Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and reportedly known within the Obama Administration as ‘financial Batman’. After a Cambridge MPhil in International Relations and a junior editorship at Foreign Affairs, he worked from 2013 to 2015 at the State Department’s Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation, moving from the Iran desk to Russia and Europe, with a stint at the Pentagon along the way. In 2015–17 he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff, overseeing the sanctions portfolio and advising John Kerry on Eurasia. Think-tank gigs followed—Atlantic Council, Center for a New American Security—along with stopovers in Silicon Valley, an adjunct appointment at Columbia and a Stanford mba. In January 2026 he became a senior fellow and director of the Center for Geoeconomics at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and Foreign Policy, among others, he has intervened in debates over the ‘economic warfare’ that is his vocation.

Chokepoints is an insider’s book, the heroes of which are other sanctions technocrats: it is assembled from extensive personal access to its ‘cast of characters’, who are typically the focus of its sixty-eight blog post-length chapters. It joins a burgeoning literature on economic warfare by other insiders, including Treasury’s War (2013) by George W. Bush’s counter-terrorism adviser Juan Zarate; War by Other Means (2016), co-authored by Robert Blackwill—another Bush appointee—and Jennifer Harris, an architect of Hillary Clinton’s agenda at State; and The Art of Sanctions (2017) by Richard Nephew, former Iran specialist on the National Security Council and veteran of Obama’s sanctions team. Ranging between memoir, user’s manual and brief for the next administration, these books celebrate the ingenuity of American statecraft and impart lessons for future apparatchiks.

It is a cliché of the genre that economic warfare is as old as time, and Fishman obliges with an opening nod to the Peloponnesian War. But he locates the origins of the present in the postwar Eurodollar market, which allowed dollar-denominated credit to accumulate offshore, beyond the reach of the us banking regulations and capital controls introduced to shore up the Bretton Woods system. Vietnam War spending led to a build-up of such claims as dollars swirled through international markets, ultimately supporting further us spending. Spooked by the resulting debt pile, other powers started demanding the gold to which their dollar holdings were supposedly equivalent, prompting Nixon to suspend convertibility in 1971. The opec oil embargo following the 1973 Arab–Israeli War spelt further disaster—headed off by the establishment of the petrodollar, which recycled global oil windfalls through the us financial system. If these crises seemed at the time to herald the end of the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’, in the event they converted it into a new kind of reserve currency. The dollar was now ‘our currency’ but ‘your problem’, in the words of Treasury Secretary John Connally.

According to Fishman, his modern, ‘inherently nonviolent’ version of economic warfare failed to blossom earlier due to the fragmentation of power across geopolitical blocs and the frequent unavoidability of the naval blockade—often the prelude to a shooting war. The 1990s Iraq embargo—which had devastating effects on the Iraqi population, and indeed preceded a hot conflict—was, for Fishman, the last gasp of an old model, for after the Cold War, the us government had become gatekeeper to the infrastructures of an integrated world market, with global banks its ‘reliable infantrymen’. Neoliberal deregulation had ‘created conditions under which new technologies—the computer, the standardized shipping container, and eventually the internet—could knit together the global economy into one giant web’. At the time, Robert Rubin, Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, recognized the possibility of exploiting dollar supremacy for political ends, but without a challenger to American primacy in sight this seemed an unnecessary risk.

9/11 was the rupture point. Political pressure to pursue ‘terrorist financing’ gave staff at the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (ofac) a new role. Stuart Levey, a lawyer brought over from Bush’s Justice Department in 2004, is the central character here, driving a reformulation of sanctions policy for new conditions. But as with the War on Terror more broadly, the pursuit of al-Qaeda quickly mutated into a campaign against ‘rogue states’—Iran, Iraq, North Korea. Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme provided the opportunity for an ‘economic weapons test’: in 2005 the Treasury Department designated a bank in Macau used by the North Korean state a ‘primary money laundering concern’ and floated the prospect of cutting it off from the us financial system. This triggered a bank run, while Chinese banks sought to distance themselves from North Korea, illustrating the reputational social dynamics through which this sort of warfare could be waged. But if this was a test, for Fishman, the first real target was Iran.

The Islamic Republic had been a focus of us sanctions since the 1979 hostage crisis, with little effect in Fishman’s view beyond curtailing bilateral economic ties. Washington encountered resistance in Europe: when Clinton banned Conoco, a us oil firm, from involvement in Iran, Total—a French energy company—happily took its place, prompting an outraged Congress to pass legislation targeting foreign firms doing business in the country. The eu responded in kind, counter-legislating to prohibit compliance with such ‘secondary sanctions’. Iran thus had reason to view the sanctions threat as a ‘toothless tiger’. Bush apparently agreed, stating in 2004 that ‘we’ve sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran’. According to Fishman, Levey took this as a challenge, constructing a new idea of financial warfare involving ‘blocking sanctions’—shutting Iranian banks out of us financial networks—and a ‘whisper campaign’ to dissuade risk-averse global banks from doing business with Iran. While it pursued these means unilaterally, Washington obtained Security Council blessing in 2006 for sanctions against the Iranian nuclear programme, lending them international legitimacy.