To what extent can the situation of the Latin American republics be likened to that of other semi-colonial nations? footnote1 Their economic position is undoubtedly semi-colonial; and as native capitalism expands and imperialist penetration grows as a consequence, the semi-colonial characteristics of their economies will be clearly emphasized. The national bourgeoisie, however, believe co-operation with the imperialist powers to be their best guarantee of a rising rate of profit; and they are sufficiently convinced of their control over political power in their own countries to feel no serious fears for national sovereignty. Thus the Latin American bourgeoisie—which with the exception of Panama, has not yet experienced military occupation—is totally unwilling to consider the idea that a second struggle for Independence is necessary, although the apra footnote2 had ingenously assumed otherwise. The State, or rather the ruling class, has no yearning for a greater or more realistic degree of national autonomy. The struggle for Independence is, relatively speaking, too recent, its myths and symbols still too vivid in the consciousness of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. The illusion of national sovereignty remains intact and effective. It would be a serious error, therefore, to assume that there exists anywhere in that social class a revolutionary nationalist sentiment in any way similar to the response that has been a factor, in other circumstances, of anti-imperialist struggle in those Asian countries which have been brought under the imperialist heel in the last few decades.

In our discussions with the apra leadership over a year ago, we rejected the proposition that a Kuomintang party in Latin America would avoid European imitations and permit us to adjust revolutionary action to a precise understanding of our own reality. Our arguments at that time ran as follows: ‘In the Chinese struggle against imperialism, collaboration with the bourgeoisie and even with many feudal elements must be understood in terms of ethnic unity and of a national civilization which does not exist in our case. The Chinese gentry or bourgeois feel themselves to be deeply Chinese. He responds to the white man’s scorn for his stratified and decrepit culture with the contempt and pride that stem from a tradition thousands of years old. In China, then, anti-imperialism rests upon a deeply felt nationalist factor. In Indoamerica the circumstances are different. The criolla footnote3 aristocracy and bourgeoisie do not feel the solidarity with the people that comes from a shared history or culture: in Peru, the white aristocrat and the bourgeois disdain the popular and national element. First and foremost, they consider themselves to be white. The mestizo footnote4 petty bourgeoisie imitates their example. The bourgeoisie of Lima fraternizes with the Yankee capitalists, and even with their mere employees, at the Country Club, the Tennis Club and in the street. The yankee takes the criolla girl in marriage with no racial or religious qualm, and she in her turn feels no nationalist or culture scruple about preferring to marry into the invading race. The middle-class girl suffers no such scruples either, and the huachafita, the lower-middle-class girl, who can ensnare one of Grace’s or the Foundation’s footnote5 Yankee employees knows that by doing so she has conquered a place several rungs up the social scale. For these objective reasons (which are presumably obvious to you all by now) the nationalist element can be neither fundamental nor decisive in the anti-imperialist struggle in our context. Only in countries like Argentina, where there is a large and wealthy bourgeoisie proud of the degree of wealth and power it has retained, and where the national personality has for these reasons assumed clearer and more precise characteristics, can anti-imperialism (perhaps) get through to the bourgeois element with comparative ease. It does so, however, in terms of capitalist growth and expansion and not in terms of social justice and socialist doctrine, as in our case.’

When this was written we were as yet unaware of the extent of the treachery of the Chinese bourgeoisie, and of the split in the Kuomintang. A closer understanding of the Chinese experience was to reveal to us later how little trust one can place, even in a country like China, in the revolutionary nationalist sentiments of the bourgeoisie.

As long as imperialist policies succeed in ‘managing’ the sentiments and legalistic expressions of national sovereignty in these States; as long as imperialism is not obliged to resort to armed intervention or military occupation, it will be able to take for granted the collaboration of the bourgeoisie. Even though they are dominated by the imperialist economy these countries, or rather their bourgeoisies, will consider themselves as much masters of their own destiny as are Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland and other ‘dependent’ European countries. This element of political psychology should not be overlooked when we begin to make a precise estimate of the possibilities for anti-imperialist activity in Latin America. It has been characteristic of apra theory to forget it, or at the least to underestimate its importance.