If I had to give as concise and accurate a definition as possible of the typical ‘Western Marxist’, I would say: ‘Someone who is firmly convinced that Freud is always right’. No, ‘Freud’ is not a slip of the pen for ‘Marx’. I really mean Freud. Where Marx, and even more where Engels or Lenin, is concerned, the typical Western Marxist has a host of reservations. Some of these are correct (since, obviously, the founders of Marxism were not infallible, they were keenly aware that they had left many problems unresolved, and they were not in a position to foresee many new phenomena which only appeared after they were dead); others are due to ‘revisionism’ in the negative sense of the word, in other words to the influence of bourgeois ideology. Where Freud is concerned, however, there are far fewer reservations, indeed often none at all. If anyone dares to question the peaceful coexistence of Marxism and psychoanalysis, or indeed their perfect compatibility, he may expect nothing but outraged reactions, charges of ‘serious misconceptions’ and vulgar positivism, and so on and so forth. There are still one or two Marxists in the West who, though they recognize Freud’s greatness and reject the stupid, slanderous Stalinist attacks on psychoanalysis, are not Freudians. But there are certainly not many of us. So I am not surprised that the publication in nlr 91 of two chapters from my Il lapsus freudiano footnote1 has provoked a veritable hail of rejoinders (see nlr 94), expressing not merely disagreement but indignation at the appearance in a serious Marxist journal of such an illogical, ill-informed and reactionary text. At all events, I far prefer the lively polemical frankness of these English comrades to the ‘diplomatic’ silence with which, barring a few exceptions, the Italian left press has greeted my work.

However, I must point out that my critics, so quick to accuse me of misunderstanding and irresponsibility in my objections to Freud’s interpretation of one slip, have themselves been somewhat hasty in their readiness to judge a book of twelve chapters (and a substantial postscript) on the basis of a reading of just two of those chapters (and even they slightly abridged). It may well be, upon reflection, that the publication of those two chapters on their own was unwise. But the premise upon which, to a greater or lesser degree, all my critics have based themselves is certainly an arbitrary one: namely, that certain of Freud’s key concepts, not mentioned in the two chapters in question, have been ignored by me in the book as a whole.

For example, almost all my assailants feel obliged to inform me that Freud accepted linguistic explanations of slips, indeed considered that a linguistic similarity (or even, though less necessarily, similarity of meaning) was almost always needed for a slip to occur, but held that such similarities were not true ‘causes’ of slips, just ‘favourable circumstances’ (Begünstigungen). Well, if I had really ignored the distinction between ‘cause’ (the re-emergence of repressed psychic elements) and Begünstigung, then truly my book would not merit discussion and should be thrown away without wasting any more time over it. But in fact a whole chapter (chapter eight) is devoted precisely to considering this distinction. In it I try to show that in the great majority of cases the so-called Begünstigungen are true causes, entirely adequate to explain slips and lapses of memory.

I cannot, for obvious reasons of space, repeat my arguments here. I can only ask my critics to wait for the English edition of my book. Then we can renew our discussion: they will in all probability remain unconvinced, but at least they will have more material to counter and perhaps even refute my arguments. Nevertheless, I would like to take up at once a number of specific points about the interpretation of slips.

In the first place, it seems to me that Jacqueline Rose is not quite right when she seeks to apply the concept of ‘overdetermination’ to the relationship which Freud establishes between the true causes of slips and the Begünstigungen. I am well aware that the meaning of the term ‘overdetermination’ was already somewhat fluid in Freud’s own work, and that Lacan—as so often—has helped to increase the confusion. But it is certainly no accident that neither in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, nor in the part of the Introductory Lectures devoted to the same subject, does Freud—so far as I am aware—use this term. Rose herself only quotes passages from The Interpretation of Dreams in this connection. In reality, for Freud, phonic (or even semantic) similarities between the word which we would expect to hear in a given context and the word spoken by the person making the slip are not ‘contributory causes’ but, precisely, simply ‘favourable circumstances’—as it were, openings through which the repressed psychic material resurfaces (to some extent forced to adapt itself to the shape of these openings, but without their exercising any active force). This is shown unambiguously by the famous comparison quoted later by Rose herself: to attribute a slip to purely linguistic causes, says Freud, would be as absurd as if, after being robbed, I reported at the police station that in a certain street ‘loneliness and darkness took away my watch and purse’. It is clear that loneliness and darkness can in no sense be considered as causes, even of a contributory and secondary kind, of the robbery, but merely as favourable conditions (in themselves inactive) of which the robber took advantage.