Two events—the April 1967 military coup d’état and the outbreak in April 1968 of the rift in the Communist Party—have opened a new period in Greek politics. They have also focused international attention on the situation in Greece. The circles of opinion that registered the impact of these events were not, of course, identical, the April coup affecting a far broader circle than the communist party rift. As a departure from the past, however, and as an omen for the future, the latter event may in the long run prove more significant than the former. It is, in any case, important enough to justify a new look at the history of the communist party and the revolutionary struggle in Greece.
The Kapetaniosfootnote1 is essentially an attempt at such a new look. In the sense that it offers a systematic critique of the record of the Greek communist leadership between 1941 and 1949 (with an epilogue which extends the critique to 1967), and by virtue of the fact that it presents the views of dissident members of that leadership registered while the events which led to the defeat of the revolution in Greece were still taking shape, Eudes’ book constitutes an important political event first and foremost for the Greek Left. But its interest is not exclusively Greek. The torment of the Communist Party of Greece and those who followed it is inextricably connected with political events and currents of history of much wider than Greek dimensions. Events like the October 1944 Stalin–Churchill understanding on spheres of influence, the February 1945 Yalta agreements, the start of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, and the Stalin–Tito clash all had immediate repercussions on the course of events in Greece. From the point of view of a British public, finally, this book has particular interest in that it was Britain which acted as the predominant foreign power on the Greek scene, in contest with Nazi Germany in the 1940–4 period and in conflict with the Greek people and its national resistance movement,
Eudes begins his story with the emergence, in the summer and autumn of 1942, of elas, the National Popular Liberation Army, a guerrilla force which sprang up as a response to the Nazi occupation of Greece (1941–4) but soon assumed the character both of a national liberation movement and (since its leadership was in the hands of the Communist Party of Greece), socially revolutionary force. elas was the military arm of eam, the National Liberation Front, which was also communist-controlled. The resistance record of these two organizations was a brilliant one. eam grew to be a political organization encompassing millions of members. Its prestige and authority made it the virtual wartime government of occupied Greece, which prevented collaborationist politicians from gaining any sort of foothold among the Greek people. This, in its turn, had the further consequence that Greek resources in manpower and, to a large extent, also in materials, were forbidden to the Nazis throughout the war. Of all countries of occupied Europe, Greece has the distinction of being the only one which sent neither workers to German factories nor expeditionary forces to fight on the Eastern Front. How the former of these feats was achieved, despite a mobilization order of the German military commander of South-Eastern Europe, is related in Eudes’ book (pp. 33ff). It is, to say the least, remarkable that eam, under a ferocious foreign occupation, was able to force the Nazi government to officially quash its labour mobilization order, by means of mass demonstrations in Athens which assumed almost insurrectional dimensions.
It was eam which created the political climate which enabled elas to move among the Greek people like Mao’s famous fish in the water. This is not to say that elas did not generate its own momentum or that its action did not have important feedback effects on eam. But the political organization, eam and the popular army elas fought side by side and mutually complemented each other. From the strictly military point of view elas, on the estimate of Field-Marshal Alexander (Eudes p. 208), had managed to pin down in Greece between six and seven divisions, in addition to the equivalent of four on the Greek islands. These forces the Nazis were unable to use on the main operational theatres. In addition elas undertook specific sabotage operations, planned by the Middle-East Allied Command and executed with the help of British saboteurs parachuted into Greece throughout the occupation. These operations were important, both with regard to hampering the flow of supplies to the German forces in North Africa and in creating a diversion during the Allied landing in Sicily in July 1943—a contribution for which General Wilson, the British Commander of the Middle-East Allied Forces, felt he had to send a special message of congratulations to the Greek guerrillas.
These distinguished services of eam–elas in the Allied cause did not win for them any gratitude on the part of the British government. It was Churchill’s view, which prevailed in the British War Cabinet, that