AMarxist can approach the Critique de la Raison Dialectique, the most recent of Sartre’s works, in a number of ways. It would be possible to write a historico-critical essay on the complex dialectical relationship between Sartre and Marxism as a movement. Equally, it would be possible to write an essay on the history of philosophy which discussed Sartre’s place in contemporary thought, showing the internal logic which led a philosopher whose starting point was the ‘cogito’ of Husserl to move beyond this towards dialectical materialism, and studying the validity of this development and its compatibility with Marx’s method itself.footnote1 Finally, and best of all, it would be possible to do both at the same time—using the regressive-progressive method which Sartre himself recommends. In this case, one would start from Sartre’s work as the singular enterprise of an individual, and then proceed to situate it in the historical context which conditioned it, showing how Sartre grappled with the problems of his time in general and Marxism in particular. This would provide a critical reconstruction of his own particular way of surpassing his problems and of being surpassed by them.
So far, none of these three possible approaches has been attempted by Marxist scholars. Whether in France, in Italy or elsewhere, most of them have postulated from the outset that Sartre must be an idealist since he has not repudiated his early work and its phenomenological method. And some have tried to prove this postulate by taking issue with the Sartrean vocabulary. Let us, therefore, define the aim and method of Sartre’s work, before examining how it is related and what it adds to contemporary Marxist thought.
The aim of the Critique is to found dialectical materialism as a method and to define the sector of being to which it is applicable. It is not as such an attempt to apply it practically in a specific field of inquiry. Put another way, the structures, notions and categories which are brought into play in the Critique are not yet operational, but pertain to the critique of a method which has been applied empirically by Marxists with success, without becoming conscious of itself and its own possibilities.
The attempt to found dialectical materialism is indubitably related in all sorts of ways to the work of the later Husserl. Husserl said of science in his time: ‘It has become unable to account for itself.’ The judgment is valid a fortiori for the human sciences and for dialectical materialism. Scientific praxis, by failing to question its own status, and by claiming to put lived experience in parentheses, has become opaque to its own practitioners. Man absents himself from the science he produces and it sheds no light on him. The sciences which study man take him for their object, ignoring the fact that the object is itself the subject (as a man of science) inquiring into it. They thereby prevent themselves from ever giving an account of their own potentialities. Finally, just as the man of science cannot understand himself from the point of view of the sciences which study man, so Marxism has been unable to explain Marxists. In other words, Marxists become unable to explain themselves.
Husserl, writing in La Crise des Sciences Européennes, remarked: ‘We lack the real awareness by which the cognitive subject could account for itself—not only in its effective actions and innovations, but also in the dimensions whose meaning is obscure and sedimented, the underlying presuppositions of its instruments, notions, propositions and theories. Do not science and the scientific method today resemble a precision machine—a machine which is obviously rendering useful service, and which anyone can learn to manipulate correctly, without having the least idea of its basis and necessity? Thus scientific method, having developed into the progressive accomplishment of a job, is a technique which can be transmitted, but which does not thereby necessarily transmit its true meaning. Thereafter theoretical work can only dominate the infinity of its themes by an infinity of methods, and an infinity of methods only by meaninglessly technical thought and activity. It is for this reason that theory can only remain genuinely and