Since the signing of the September 1993 Oslo I agreement, the Israel-Palestine ‘peace process’ has been punctuated by a series of dramatic developments. The purpose of this article is to assess their significance. I will first examine the September 1995 Oslo II agreement, the definitive document for the interim period until a final settlement is reached. I will then consider the likely outcome of the ‘peace process.’ I will finally suggest that, contrary to widespread belief, the recent victory of Benjamin Netanyahu will not substantively affect the process set in motion at Oslo. To clarify the issues at stake, I will refer to two illuminating critiques of Oslo I, Edward Said’s Peace and its Discontents and Meron Benvenisti’s Intimate Enemies.footnote1
The essence of the September 1993 Oslo agreement, according to Edward Said, was that it gave ‘official Palestinian consent to continued occupation.’ Indeed, the plo agreed to serve as ‘Israel’s enforcer.’footnote2 ‘The occupation continued’ after Oslo i, Meron Benvenisti similarly observes, ‘albeit by remote control, and with the consent of the Palestinian people, represented by their “sole representative”, the plo.’footnote3 A close reading of the September 1995 Oslo ii agreement only reinforces these judgements.footnote4
Until Oslo, the international consensus supported a complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and the right of Palestinians to form an independent state within the evacuated areas. The plo accepted these terms. Israel and the us rejected them. Oslo ii states that ‘Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims, or positions.’footnote5 Seemingly balanced, this provision actually signals a most crucial concession by the Palestinians. In effect, the plo grants a legitimacy to Israel’s pretence of possessing ‘existing rights’ in the West Bank and Gaza, and to Israel’s rejectionist ‘claims, or positions,’ including those denying Palestinians the right to sovereignty in the
On all crucial issues—Jerusalem, water, reparations, sovereignty, security, land—Palestinians, according to Said, ‘have in effect gained nothing.’footnote7 The actual picture is, if anything, even bleaker than Said suggests.
Jerusalem: Amid an analysis of Jerusalem as the nexus of Israel’s conquest strategy (‘an ever-expanding Jerusalem [is] the core of a web extending into the West Bank and Gaza’), Said presciently observes that ‘in the history of colonial invasion. . .maps are instruments of conquest.’footnote8 Turning to Oslo ii, we find that, although the text leaves Jerusalem’s fate for the permanent status negotiations,footnote9 to judge by the map appended to the accord, Jerusalem is already a closed issue. The official map for Oslo ii implicitly places Jerusalem within Israel. Said also laments that the plo agreed to ‘cooperate with a military occupation before that occupation had ended, and before even the government of Israel had admitted that it was in effect a government of military occupation.’footnote10 Indeed, the so-called Green Line demarcating pre-June 1967 Israel from the occupied West Bank has been effaced on the official Oslo ii map. The area between the Mediterranean and Jordan now constitutes a unitary entity. Seamlessly incorporating the West Bank, Israel has ceased to be, in the new cartographic reality, an occupying power. On the other hand, the textual claim that Oslo ii preserves the ‘integrity’ of the West Bank and Gaza as a ‘single territorial unit’footnote11 is mockingly belied by the map’s yellow and brown blotches denoting relative degrees of Palestinian control awash in a sea of white denoting total Israeli sovereignty. In sum, the official map for Oslo ii ratifies an extreme version of the Labour Party’s Allon plan and gives the lie to the tentative language of the agreement itself.footnote12