Things in Ireland can be even worse than that. Sectarianism from a Belfast Protestant is nothing new; but even Irish liberal pluralists can be a bitterly partisan bunch, excoriating traditional prejudices with a virulence so unremitting as to involve them in a kind of performative contradiction. In this articulate, claustrophobic, intensely combative culture, theoretical enquiry is now so locked into political doctrine, power and discourse so intimately intertwined, that even Michel Foucault might have been driven to put in a word for disinterestedness. There are commentators on Irish affairs today who would be simply incapable of giving a fair review to the work of their political opponents. And much of this is in line with a history which, given the relative absence of an industrial middle class, the depth of ethnic division and the dominance of a corporatist Catholicism in the island as a whole, never produced any very flourishing liberal tradition.
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s eminently judicious, splendidly level-headed study of Northern Ireland is therefore especially welcome.footnote＊ McGarry and O’Leary, it should be said, are not in the least disinterested—they are, by and large, ‘neo-nationalists’ of the sdlp variety—but they strive to give both Unionist and traditional nationalist causes their due, before proceeding to rap them both sternly over the knuckles (the book’s partisan subtext peeps through in the more sardonic, polemical tone of its endnotes). Beginning with Irish nationalism, while properly insisting that Unionism is in fact a species of nationalism too, they discriminate its exclusively ethnic and inclusively civic varieties, and acknowledge that Sinn Fein, despite its almost wholly ethnic constituency, is formally committed to the latter. They are critical, however, of Sinn Fein’s majoritarian (all-Ireland) principle of self-determination: if the principle of majority self-determination within Ulster alone had been operative at the time of partition then Fermanagh and Tyrone, along with
McGarry and O’Leary are also sceptical of the nationalist belief in British imperialism as the cause of the current conflict, or as the central obstacle to its resolution. It is, they argue implausibly, ‘merely one set of causal agents’ in the struggle. With some justice, they see traditional Irish nationalism as having drastically underestimated the tenacity of Unionist political preferences, and deny that ira violence, unlike that of the Irish war of independence, has either any popular mandate of legitimacy or any claim to meet the eminently reasonable criteria for a just war embedded in Catholic theology. One such criterion is that violence must be the only means available to resolve a serious injustice, whereas the ira would presumably have to claim with neo-scholastic subtlety that violence was the only means available to them to resolve an injustice by other means. In McGarry and O’Leary’s eyes and, as some Sinn Feiners will now acknowledge, the armed struggle has served to reinforce Unionist intransigency, inhibited political reform and economic investment, and provoked the British authorities into further erosion of civil liberties. Irish unification, so the book argues, demands the consent of the Unionists, a continuing British presence in the country and changes in the constitution and public policy of the Republic; and European institutions may well facilitate it better than traditional nationalist models.
The tone of the study sharpens significantly when it turns to examine ‘green’ or republican Marxist accounts of Northern Ireland. Such a case, so it argues, trades in simplistic ‘false consciousness’ notions of Unionist hostility to national unity, views ethnic, national and religious issues as purely superstructural, and delivers an implausibly economistic account of Great Britain’s interests in the North. If partition was indeed, among other things, economically motivated, the British presence in the North can hardly be said to be so now, with a subvention from London to the region of £3.5 billion per year. But not all green Marxism is economistic, as the authors are somewhat grudgingly constrained to acknowledge in quoting, among others, Eamonn McCann; there have been strong political reasons for the British presence too. In granting this, McGarry and O’Leary also retain a degree of scepticism: a united independent Ireland within nato might have served British geo-political interests just
McGarry and O’Leary then turn to the discourse of Unionism, discriminating its devolutionist and integrationist wings, and critically inspecting its claim that the primary cause of the Northern conflict is the irredentist posture of the Irish Republic and the uncertainty of the British commitment to the region. The authors point out in response that the Unionists have never taken the nationalist minority in the North seriously; that they have consistently denied their unjust treatment of them; and that—since most uk citizens apparently do not regard the Unionists as authentically British—some of the arguments Unionist use to reject the nationalist case for a single Irish nation can be deployed just as effectively to dismiss their own case for Northern Ireland as exclusively part of the British nation-state. Unionist ‘majoritarian’ thinking is arguably incoherent: if it holds that the majority in the uk cannot overrule the preferences of the majority within Northern Ireland, then it has no grounds for claiming that the majority within Northern Ireland should overrule the preferences of the minority there. Unionism’s hostility to the irredentist clauses of the Republic’s constitution overlooks the fact that Article 29 of the same constitution binds the southern state to the pacific settlement of international disputes. A strain of revisionist Unionism views the British state as an embodiment of pluralism and liberal individualism, in contrast to an ethnically based nation-state, and thus as