Ihave been thinking about this quite a lot because I wrote a book about him which needed updating. I found that his radicalization started at the end of 1986, when preparations were underway for the Central Committee Plenum on problems of ideology and leadership. At this time the conflict was growing sharper between the conservatives and the liberal or democratic wing, and the plenum was actually postponed three times because Gorbachev’s report was more radical than the Central Committee was prepared to accept. A number of specific measures during this period had a kind of spontaneous character: in the case of Sakharov, for instance, Gorbachev seems to have acted over the heads of the KGB and taken a
Yes, that’s right, although things were not all that clear at the time. The conference itself had a definite air of caution because it was convened according to the old rules: a complete process of indirect election or selection gave advantages to the conservatives, who formed the great bulk of delegates from the provinces if not from Moscow and Leningrad. However, this conservative majority didn’t have any thought-out programme, so Gorbachev was able to get through his reorganization of the party or state system and the proposals for election of a People’s Congress.
No, no, it was entirely unexpected, even by Gorbachev. Under the new system, a preliminary sorting took place at district level where there were often ten or twelve nominations and the election committee was able to refuse some nominations and accept others—few districts had more than two candidates, and about a fifth had only one. The second safeguard was the election of the Supreme Soviet by the Congress of People’s Deputies as a whole. The final insurance was a bloc of seats to be filled by nomination of the party or of various other official bodies or associations more or less controlled by the
This is an interesting story, which has a lot to do with the fact that the new system made it possible for people to take part in a genuinely secret ballot. Previously the ballot box would be situated just in front of the election committee, so that voters who did not have anything against the candidate—there was only one—were expected just to put the ballot paper into the box. There were some booths on the other side of the room, but the only reason for using them would have been to strike out the candidate’s name. So in effect there was nothing secret about the way in which people voted. In last year’s election, however, since there were often two or three candidates, people could not vote simply by placing the ballot paper in the box but had to use the private booth provided. About five hundred districts had only one name, but even there people still had reason to use the private booth because elections for the district representative were held at the same time as elections for the House of Nationalities where a choice of candidates was more common. Voters faced with only one name in the district elections felt cheated and many of them protested by voting against. In roughly half of such districts the single candidate was not elected.
Yes. But there is another aspect of the electoral arrangements which contributed unexpectedly to the defeat of official candidates. I believe that here in Britain or France, or in other countries, there is only a name and a party affiliation on the ballot. In the Soviet Union they made a very interesting miscalculation. They thought it wasn’t good enough to have just a name—sometimes people wouldn’t know that Ivanov or Petrov was regional or district Secretary. So they decided that the person’s position and residence would be indicated as well. Thus an obkom secretary who stood as a candidate expected that he would have an advantage over an ordinary housewife or worker or engineer or historian. But this was far from being generally the case: people preferred to give their approval to somebody who was not so important, not so elevated. Thus an admiral or Warsaw Pact commander lost the ballot in favour of some local military captain; or the chairman of a local collective farm won against the head of a Central Committee department. Another reason for this was that whereas in the past people thought a high Party official might help their district to get preference in supplies, or would be better suited to help them in some other way, the worsening economic situation had significantly weakened such expectations and shortages of every type meant that public dissatisfaction was greater. All these factors, then, played an important role, and had it not been for safe seats nominated by public organizations, many important figures like Ligachev would not have been elected.