Labour’s defeat in the General Election offers a profound challenge to the Party. It clearly calls for a period of sober reflection in which a serious analysis of the results can be made. We must forge new links with those too often thought of as natural Labour supporters. We must develop a socialist response to the problems of those who voted against Margaret Thatcher yet were attracted to the sdp/Liberal Alliance rather than to the Labour Party. We will also have to examine why it was that many who were angry about unemployment still did not accept that we had an effective strategy for overcoming it. There will be those on the Right predisposed to argue that the Left must be blamed for the defeat. They will argue that the policies and constitutional changes proposed by the Left were the source of our unpopularity and should therefore be thrown out as soon as possible. The Left will be entitled to reply that even the best policies do not guarantee instant success; they have to be effectively and convincingly advocated. The Party Manifesto embodied some major policy advances even if some leading spokesmen were not fully convinced
Labour may have been badly defeated but it continues to embody the best hopes and energies of working people; indeed, as I will suggest below, its major problem is that the survival of cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures still inhibit the Party from becoming a dynamic popular force. In this article I would like first to reply to those critics of the Party who consider that it will always compromise socialist objectives, or that the struggle to make it a more effective and democratic instrument of socialist advance is a lost cause. The results of the election confront the Party with grave problems but they offer no comfort at all to the reduced groups of socialists who have remained outside it. The only way to halt the menacing shift to the right in British politics is to press through the renewal of the Labour Party. The Left will have to learn to build on its successes and learn from its mistakes. The Constituency Labour Parties are a more lively force today than they were ten years ago and the level of membership has increased steadily over recent years, recruiting from new layers of the community. The Party’s new journal, The New Socialist, has been a great success and reaches an audience outside the Party. Many supporters of cnd, of the womens’ movement and of other radical causes look to Labour for a positive response to their demands. In London, Sheffield and elsewhere Labour local government has displayed a new vitality and imaginativeness. All this may seem modest compared with the magnitude of the election defeat but it could provide pointers to recovery and future success. And it can scarcely be supposed that those who remain outside the Party have a more realistic prospect to offer us. Once I have replied to our critics on the Left I will advance some ideas on practical steps that could be taken to improve the working of the Party.
In his article ‘The Limits of the Labour Left’ (nlr 129), David Coates says, ‘It is clearly better . . . for the Labour Party to be committed to unilateral disarmament than to the Bomb, to favour workers’ control over one-man management, . . . and to support a more rather than less radical version of the Alternative Economic Strategy. Even when it is recognized that the revolutionary left have played an important role in shaping extra-parliamentary movements that have initiated many of their demands, it still has to be conceded that someone has to push them inside the Party.’
Precisely. The policy and organizational changes inside the Labour Party did not come about by accident. There were, it is true, powerful political motives for the change—i.e., the experiences of the Wilson and Callaghan governments as well as the earlier Gaitskell-versus-Bevanite controversy—but there also had to be people within the Party who were arguing and
Thus in spite of his recognition that ‘someone had to push them [from] inside the party’, Coates is reluctant to draw the logical conclusion and urge all socialists to join the Labour Party. Instead he recommends ‘unity campaigns’. This is an old and familiar argument. It was heard especially in the late 1930s when such a unity initiative involved the Communist Party, the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist League (a left grouping inside the Labour Party). Indeed over the years the Communist Party has consistently argued for such campaigns, even during the 1939–40 period when their opposition to ‘imperialist war’ isolated them from most of the labour movement. As elusive as such ‘unity’ campaigns may have been in those days, it is today—when the left outside the Party is even smaller—quite an illusory strategy. As attempts on the part of certain ‘revolutionary’ socialists to remain pure and untainted by reality, such efforts are time-consuming and, at the end of the day, show little for the work involved.