On 27 April 1978 the world heard that there had been a successful military coup in Afghanistan. The régime headed by Mohammad Daud, which had itself come to power through a coup in July 1973, had been suddenly overthrown by tanks and jet planes that struck in the Afghan capital, Kabul. At first it seemed as if this was yet another military intervention which, although violent and abrupt, involved no major shift in the policies, social character or international alignment of those in power: a change comparable to Daud’s own coup, or to others in neighbouring Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Arab world. Yet within days it became clear that the announcements of radical change coming over Radio Kabul were more than just the ritual demagogy of military coups: something rather more substantial had occurred.
In the first place, the coup, although carried out by the military, reflected much wider political forces. It had been preceded by mass popular demonstrations in Kabul, and as thousands of people flocked to inspect Daud’s conquered palace,
However surprising the events of April, it has not taken long for the international response to assume its form. The ussr and its allies have moved with considerable decision to support the new régime, and the Soviet commitment to the pdpa has been made abundantly clear. Reactions elsewhere have been predictably hostile. The usa was, it has been reported, caught unawares by the pdpa’s seizure of power, although its Iranian clients in savak were not.footnote1 For years the Americans had relied on an equilibrium with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan: focusing short-sightedly on the strategic aspect alone of their policies, they ignored the unfolding social dynamic within Afghanistan itself and complacently expected the corrupt tribal régime to continue for the indefinite future. Within weeks, however, the us government was waging a propaganda offensive against what it again construed in uniquely strategic terms as a Soviet advance in Afghanistan—comparable to Angola and Ethiopia—and a conference of 270 us experts met under nato auspices in Annapolis to reflect upon this new development. Referring back to Kipling’s description of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan as ‘The Great Game’, one American strategic expert declared: ‘The “Great Game” is over and the Russians have won it’.footnote2
Alarm of equal magnitude has been manifest in three of Afghanistan’s neighbours—Pakistan, Iran and China. Afghanistan has long played a major role in Pakistani politics, by claiming to champion the cause of the six million Pushtuns or Pathans who live in north-west Pakistan and to a lesser extent the three million Baluchis in the west of the country.footnote3 A
The new régime therefore finds itself caught in a precarious international situation. Faced with the hostility of its three other neighbours, it is reliant to a considerable extent on the Soviet Union—with only India, a traditional ally, providing an alternative source of support. Moreover, these external pressures interlock with numerous and profound internal difficulties. For whilst the pdpa is revolutionary in intention and whilst Afghanistan is desperately in need of social transformation, the new régime is boxed in by daunting problems. Its own organization of a few thousand cadres has an almost totally urban base, in a country where ninety per cent of the population live in the countryside. Despite the popular character of the upheaval in Kabul itself, the advent to power reflected a nation-wide crisis only in the sense that the previous régime had been decomposing under the impact of Afghanistan’s many contradictions. The mobilization of the mass of the Afghan oppressed has only just begun. The relations between civilian and military appear to be vexed, and to this is added the fact that the pdpa itself is riven by a dangerous factionalism.